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I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Each of the decedents in this consolidated appeal, John D. Stoor ("Stoor"), Robert 
Branch, Jr. ("Branch"), William D. Frasure ("Frasure") and John H. Adamson ("Adamson") 
(collectively "Decedents"), allegedly contracted asbestos-related lung diseases more than two (2) 
years prior to their deaths. However, none of them chose to file a lawsuit in Idaho against 
Respondents, suppliers and users of asbestos-containing products (collectively "Defendants") 
within this two-year period. Instead, each of these Decedents allowed the two-year personal 
injury statute of limitation contained in Idaho Code C'1.C.") § 5-219(4) to expire. (See R., Ex. 1, 
pp. 14-17; R. Vol. VII, pp. 1644-1646.) 
Decedents' wrongful death heirs, Alene Stoor, Stephanie Branch and Marlene Kisling 
(collectively, "Castorena Plaintiffs") and John D. Adamson ("Adamson Plaintiff') (collectively 
"Heirs" or "Plaintiffs"), seek to revive rights of action which were legally dead by pursuing 
wrongful death claims. The Heirs contend that, regardless of the fact that the Decedents' 
personal injury claims had expired, they are still entitled to maintain their wrongful death claims 
because their actions were timely filed within the two-year limitation period for wrongful death 
claims. The Heirs miss the point. This is not a wrongful death statute of limitations case. This 
is a condition precedent rule case. Even though the Heirs' wrongful death claims may not be 
barred by the wrongful death statute of limitations, they are barred by the condition precedent 
rule imposed by Idaho's wrongful death statute, I.C. § 5-31 1. 
RESPONDENTS' BNEF 
For nearly a century, this Court has clearly and consistently construed LC. 5 5-3 11 to 
require that, as a prerequisite or "condition precedent" to maintaining a wrongful death action, a 
wrongful death claimant must show that the decedent had a valid claim at the time of death. For 
sound policy reasons, this Court has repeatedly held that, where a decedent's claim is barred 
prior to death, hislher heirs' wrongful death claims are likewise barred by the condition 
precedent rule. 
This appeal arises because two District Courts followed this Court's well established rule 
and dismissed the Heir's claims. Mildred Castorena, el al. v. General Electric, et al., Bannock 
County District Court Case No. 2006-2474 ("Castorena Case"), and John D. Adamson, et al. v. 
FMC Corporation, et al., Bannock County District Court Case No. 2006-3 166 ("Adamson 
Case").' Because there was no dispute that the personal injury claims of these Decedents were 
barred prior to their deaths by the running of the personal injury statute of limitations, the 
District Courts in the Castorena and Adamson Cases correctly dismissed the wrongful death 




' Another case, Willis Eugene Norton, Sr. v. General Electric, el al., Bannock County 
District Court Case No. 2006-2475 ("Norton Case"), was also consolidated with the Castorena 
and Adamson Cases for appeal purposes, but no issues from the Norton Case are relevant to this 
appeal. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
B. Course of ProceedingsIStatement of Facts. 
1. Castorena Case. 
The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. (Appellant's Joint Brief ("App. 
Brf."), at xii). On June 2, 2006, the Castorena Plaintiffs2 filed a complaint against multiple 
Defendants, including Westinghouse,3 Ingersoll-Rand Corporation ("Ingersoll-Rand"), Sterling 
Fluid Systems (USA), LLC ("Sterling"), and Henry Vogt Machine Co." Their complaint alleged 
that their Decedents (Stoor, Branch and Frasure) contracted asbestos disease resulting in their 
deaths due to exposure to Defendants' asbestos-containing products. (R. Vol. I, p. 87.) * 
Mildred Castorena, individually and as the spouse and personal representative of the 
Estate of Ted Castorena, Robert L. Hronek and Norman L. Day were also named as plaintiffs in 
the Castorena Case, but their claims were dismissed on grounds not relevant to this appeal. The 
only claims which are the subject of this appeal are those of wrongful death plaintiffs Alene 
Stoor, Stephanie Branch and Marlene Kisling. 
CBS Corporation, a Delaware corporation, fMa Viacom Inc., successor by merger to 
CBS Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation, f/Wa Westinghouse Electric Corporation. 
' A complete list of all of the defendants named in the Castorena Case is attached in an 
addendum to this brief as Exhibit "1" and a complete list of the defendants named in the 
Adamson Case is attached to this brief as Exhibit "2." The defendants named in the Adamson 
Case are not all the same defendants named in the Castorena Case. 
The complaint contained eight (8) counts, but only two (2), Count One (Negligence) 
and Count Two (Strict Products Liability), are relevant to this appeal. Counts Five, Six, Eight 
and Nine relate to defendants other than Westinghouse, Ingersoll-Rand and Sterling. Count 
Three (Misrepresentation) and Count Four (Battery, Civil Conspiracy, Fraud and Fraudulent 
Concealment) were dismissed against all Castorena Plaintiffs for failure to allege with 
specificity, pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 9, and for failure to allege facts sufficient to create a 
genuine material dispute of fact, pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 56. (R., Ex. 1, pp. 10-13; R. Vol. VII, 
p. 1641 .) The dismissal of these counts was not appealed. The complaint does not contain any 
Count Seven. 
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Westinghouse, Ingersoll-Rand and other Defendants moved for summary judgment 
against the Castorena Plaintiffs on the ground that the claims failed to comply with the condition 
precedent rule, because the personal injury claims of their Decedents were barred by the Idaho 
personal injury statute of limitations prior to their deaths. (R. Vol. V, pp. 11 10, 1145; R. Vol. 
VI, p. 1433.) Plaintiffs do not dispute the following facts? 
. .- . . . . . - - -. -- -. -. ... - 
.Date .of ExpiraGw 1.~ , 
, ; , . , : , - , ] T I  of ~ e n o o a l  lnjuty Wrudgful . '.: 
Statute of '  . . . '. Death Suit .' 1 
~ i m i ~ i t i o n s  . -- - 
. ... . . 
Date .- .  ... o f  . .- Dcatli Wasflied - ' ..  
Stoor. Stoor was diagnosed with, andor had objective medical proof of, 
-
asbestos-related lung disease on or prior to September 28,2001. (R. Vol. V, p. 
11 18,77 3-5,7 and 8; App. Brf. at xii.) Stoor died on June 13,2004. (R. Vol. V, 
p. 11 18,7 2; App. Brf. at xiii.) Stoor's wrongful death heirs filed the wrongful 
death complaint which is the subject of this appeal on June 2,2006. (R. Vol. I, p. 




Branch. Branch was diagnosed with, andlor had objective medical proof of, 
asbestos-related lung disease on or prior to July 1,2003. (R. Vol. V, p. 1128,77 
4-6; App. Brf. at xiii.) Branch died on July 11,2005. (R. Vol. V, p. 1128,T 2; 
App. Brf. at xiii.) Branch's wrongful death heirs filed the wrongful death suit 
which is the subject of this appeal on June 2,2006. (R. Vol. I, p. 87; App Brf. at 
xiii.) 
Frasure. Frasure was diagnosed with, andlor had objective medical proof of, 
asbestos-related lung disease on or prior to August 25,2000. (R. Vol. V, p. 1137, 




The Plaintiffs did not file any opposing affidavits setting forth any disputed facts on 











1137,12; App. Brf. at xiv.) Frasure's wrongful death heirs filed the wrongful 
death suit which is the subject of this appeal on June 2,2006. (R. Vol. I, p. 87; 
App. Brf. at xiv.) 
The District Court initially denied defendants' motion. (R., Ex. 1.) However, 
Defendants moved for reconsideration of the District Court's decision, to point out that the 
District Court had neglected the Idaho Supreme Court's clear direction to treat the wrongful 
death statute "as if '  it contained the condition precedent bar. (R. Vol. VI, p. 1482; R. Vol. VII, p 
1589.) After taking note of its oversight of this Court's direction, the District Court entered a 
second decision on March 18, 2008, ruling that the Castorena Plaintiffs' claims were barred by 
the condition precedent rule imposed by I.C. § 5-3 11, because the claims of the Decedents had 
expired prior to their deaths. (R. Vol. VII, p. 1641 .)7 In reaching this conclusion, the District 
Court stated: 
. . . while the Wrongful Death Statute does not expressly contain the condition 
precedent language found in Lord Campbell's Act, the Idaho Supreme Court 
interprets I.C. 5 5-3 11 as ifit did contain such language and has consistentlv and 
repeatedly required that the Wrongful Death Statute be read "as if it exuresslv 
contained the urovisiott, 'Whertever the wronpful act would have entitled the 
person injured to maintain an action if death had not ensued."' 
(R. Vol. VII, pp. 1641, 1651.)' 
' In its March 18,2008 Order, the Court also granted defendants summary judgment on 
the remaining counts ofplaintiffs' complaint, but that portion of the ruling is not the subject of 
this appeal. 
The Court entered judgment on June 19,2008 ("Judgment") in accordance with its 
March 18,2008 Order. (R. Vol. VII, p. 1720.) Both the District Court's Order and the Judgment 
were certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). (R. Vol. VII, pp. 1641, 1720.) On April 
21, 2008, the Castorena Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal of the District Court's March 18, 
2008 Order on the condition precedent issues only. (R. Vol. VII, p. 1690.) 
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2. Adamson Case. 
On July 18,2006, the Adamson Plaintiff filed a colnplaint against multiple Defendants, 
alleging that the decedent Adamson contracted asbestos disease resulting in his death due to 
exposure to Defendants' asbestos-containing products. (R. Vol. VIII, p. 1751.)9 Sterling and 
other Defendants moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of these wrongful death 
claims on the ground that they were barred by the condition precedent rule. (R. Vol. IX, pp. 
2134,2142; R. Vol. IX, pp. 2295(a), 2290,2295,2301,2312 and 2319; R. Vol. X, pp. 2365 and 
2371.) Plaintiffs do not dispute the following facts:" 
.- ... ... - - :-- 
Expiration of I 
I'ersonal lnju'q Date Wrongful 
Statute of Death Suit Was' 
Date of Death Filed 
/ Adamson 1 March 8,2002 1 March 8,2004 1 July 20,2004 1 July 18,2006 1 
Adamson. Adamson was diagnosed with, and/or had objective medical proof of, 
asbestos-related lung disease, mesothelioma, on March 8,2002. (R. Vol. X, p. 
2233; App. Brf at xi.) Adamson alIegedly died from mesothelioma on July 20, 
2004. (R. Vol. VIII, p. 1781; R. Vol. X, p. 2279; App. Brf. at xi.) Adamson's 
wrongful death heir filed the wrongful death action which is the subject of this 
appeal on July 18,2006. (R. Vol. VIII, p. 1751; App. Brf. at xi.) 
The complaint contains seven (7) counts, but only three (3), Count One (Negligence), 
Count Two (Strict Products Liability), and Count Six (Joint and Several Liability), are relevant to 
issues raised by this appeal. Counts Five and Seven of the complaint relate to other defendants. 
Count Three (Misrepresentation) and Count Four (Battery and Fraud and/or Conspiracy to 
Commit Fraud or Fraudulent Concealment) were dismissed by the Court on grounds which are 
not the subject ofthis appeal. (R. Vol. XI, pp. 2479,2598.) 
'O The Adamson Plaintiff did not file any opposing affidavits setting forth any disputed 
facts on issues raised by Sterling's Motion. (R. Vol. X, p. 2322(a) and Vol. XI, pp. 2417,2467.) 
RESPONDENTS' BMEF 
The District Court granted the defendants' motion. Citing this Court's cases, the District 
Court dismissed the wrongful death claims of the Adamson Plaintiff because Adamson's claims 
were barred prior to his death by the statute of limitations." (R. Vol. XI, p. 2479.) Although 
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, the District Court issued a second decision confirming that 
the wrongful death claim was barred. (R. Vol. XI, p. 2506; R. Vol. XI, p. 2598.)12 
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does the condition precedent rule imposed by I.C. 5 5-31 1 bar Plaintiffs' 
wrongful death claims where the personal injury claims of their Decedents were barred prior to 
their deaths by the two-year statute of limitations in I.C. 5 5-219(4)? 
2. Does the condition precedent rule deprive Plaintiffs of access to the courts in 
violation of Article I, Section 18 of the Idaho Constitution? 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. The Condition Precedent Rule Precludes the Heirs' Claims. 
1. Idaho Iias Followed the Condition Precedent Rule for Over a Century. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently followed the condition precedent rule, which 
requires that, as an essential prerequisite or "condition precedent" to a wrongful death action 
" The District Court entered judgment in favor of Sterling and other Defendants against 
the Adamson Plaintiff on April 9,2008. (R. Vol. XI, p. 2495.) 
I Z  The District Court entered an amended judgment against the Adarnson Plaintiff in 
favor of Defendants on October 2,2008. (R. Vol. XI, p. 2613.) On October 31,2008, the 
Adamson Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal of the Court's April 9,2008 Order. (R. Vol. XI, p. 
2622.) On December 22,2008, the Supreme Court entered an order consolidating the appeals of 
the Adamson Case and the Castorena Case. (R. Vol. XI, p. 2635.) 
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brought by the decedent's heirs, the decedent must have had a valid claim against the same 
defendants at the time of death. This rule bars the Plaintiffs' claims in these cases. 
"The Idaho legislature, in enacting I.C. 5 5-3 11, adopted the substance of Lord 
Campbell's Act." Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 1 17 Idaho 1038, 1040,793 P.2d 71 1,713 
(1990); see Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622,627,269 P. 993 (1928). I. C. § 5-3 1 l(1) states: 
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect o f  another, 
his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain an action 
for damages against the person causing the death, or in case of the death of such 
wrongdoer, against the personal representative of such wrongdoer, whether the 
wrongdoer dies before or after the death of the person injured. 
I.C. § 5-31 l(1) (emphasis added). By comparison, Lord Campbell's Act allows recovery only if 
the claim is "such as would (if Death had not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain 
an action and recover Damages in respect thereof." Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 117 Idaho at 
1039 n. 1,793 P.2d 712 n.l (emphasis added). Although I.C. 5 5-3 11 does not contain the same 
condition precedent language found in Lord Campbell's Act, this Court has held that the Idaho 
legislature adopted the substance of Lord Campbell's Act, and directed that the Idaho statute 
must be read "as if" it contained the same condition precedent language. 
The condition precedent rule was first applied over a century ago. In Northern PaciJic 
Railway Co. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440 (1904), the United States Supreme Court held that Idaho's 
wrongful death statute contained the condition precedent that the decedent must have been able 
to recover "had he not been killed, but only injured." Id at 450. In Northern PaciJic, the railway 
gave an attorney a free ticket to ride in exchange for a waiver of the railway's liability. During 
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the rail trip, the attorney was killed. In spite of the waiver, his heirs brought a wrongful death 
action against the railway, 
As in this case, the question presented was whether the heirs' wrongful death action 
could be maintained where the decedent's claim was barred prior to his death. The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that because the passenger could not have successfully sued the railroad, the 
heirs had no cause of action. Id. at 440-441. The Court explained that the wrongful death 
plaintiffs' claim depended on the decedent's right of action, stating that "[i]f there be no 
omission of duty to the decedent, his heirs have no claim." Id at 449. 
They [the heirs] claim under him [the decedent], and they can recover only in 
case he could have recovered damages had he not been killed, but only iniured. 
The company is not under two different measures of obligation - one to the 
passenger and another to his heirs. If it discharges its full obligation to the 
passenger, his heirs have no right to compel it to pay damages. 
Id. at 450 (emphasis added). Pursuant to Northern Pacific, there is only one measure of the 
obligation - the obligation owed to the decedent. If the decedent does not have a valid cause of 
action, the heirs have no cause of action. 
In 1928, in the case of Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622,269 P. 993, this Court adopted 
Northern Pacij(ic's holding that the Idaho wrongful death statute included a "condition 
precedent." The issue in Sprouse focused on whether the rights ofthe children of a mother who 
died in childbirth were broader than the rights the mother would have had if she had survived. 
This Court followed Northern Paczjk in holding that the heirs "claim under" the decedent, and 
the heirs "can recover only in case he could have recovered damages had he not been killed, but 
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only injured." Sprouse, 46 Idaho at 627,269 P. at 994. This Court explained that this "condition 
precedent" rule is implied into the wrongful death statute: 
Under Lord Campbell's Act, the original model for all statutes giving a cause of 
action for so-called death by wrongful act, the act, neglect, or default must have 
been such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action therefor 
if death had not ensued. . . . While this limitation or condition upon the 
maintenance o f  the action is not included in the Idaho act, . . . no case has 
been found in which it has not been implied. 
Id. at 627,269 P. at 994 (emphasis added). 
Six years later, this Court again confirmed this interpretation of the wrongful death 
statute, ruling that the Idaho wrongful death statute must be read "as if it expressly contained" 
the condition precedent language. In Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667,34 P.2d 957 (1934), the 
decedent was killed in an altercation with police officers in Fremont County. The respondents 
argued that they could not be held liable in a state such as Idaho that did not contain the express 
condition precedent language of Lord Campbell's Act. Id at 676-677, 34 P.2d at 960-961. The 
Court responded to this argument by explaining that the wrongful death statute in Idaho should 
he interpreted as if it contained this express language: 
Thus it will be seen that by the construction this court has placed on said 
statute, it has the same force and effect, bv imalication, as i f  it expresslv 
contained the arovision, "Whenever the wronpful act would have entitled the 
person iniured to maintain an action i f  death had not ensued. " 
Id. at 678 (emphasis added).13 
Helgeson ordered that the wrongful death statute be interpreted "as if it expressly 
contained" the condition precedent provision. Id. at 678,34 P.2d at 961. This mandate 
undermines Plaintiffs' oft-repeated argument that there is no condition precedent language in the 
wrongful death statute. (App. Br. 6, 8, 9, 12). When Plaintiffs argue that this provision is not 
expressly contained in the statute, they overIook the contrary direction of this Court that it is. 
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After the Helgeson case in 1934, the Idaho Supreme Court continued to apply and follow 
the condition precedent rule. Hooten v. City ofBurley, 70 Idaho 369,375,219 P.2d 651,654 
(1950) ("The plaintiffs in this case may recover for decedent's death only if he, if living, could 
have recovered for his injuries." ); Shirts v. Shultz, 76 Idaho 463,469,285 P.2d 479,482 (1955), 
(heirs "can recover only in case [the decedent] could have recovered damages had he not been 
'killed, but only injured."); Clarkv. Foster, 87 Idaho 134, 144, 391 P.2d 853, 859 (1964) ("for 
sixty years this jurisdiction and others have uniformly held" that the wrongful death statute 
should be interpreted "as if it contained" the condition precedent rule); Anderson v. Gailey, 97 
Idaho 813, 823,555 P.2d 144, 154 (1976) (change fiom contributory negligence to comparative 
negligence did not affect the rule); Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 105 Idaho 785, 787, 
673 P.2d 385, 387 (1 983) ("heirs can bring an action only if the deceased could have"). 
In Bevan v. Vassar Farms, 1 17 Idaho 1038,793 P.2d 71 1, this Court again followed the 
condition precedent rule. The Bevan case involved the death of a farm worker who was killed 
while attempting to repair a corn chopper machine. The jury found the decedent 50% negligent 
and the equipment owner 50% negligent. Because of the condition precedent rule, the district 
court attributed the decedent's negligence to the heirs, which barred the claim. The heirs 
appealed, arguing that their rights were broader than the decedent's rights, and asking this Court 
to overrule the long line of cases establishing the condition precedent rule. The Idaho Supreme 
Court rejected the plaintiffs' appeal, and instead followed the "well established" condition 
precedent rule: 
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Bevan requests that we overrule well established precedent and the long line of 
cases from this Court providing a different interpretation. Notwithstanding the 
absence of the suggested language in I.C. $ 5-31 1, it is well established in this 
jurisdiction tltcrt "[ilfthe clecedertt's rtegligetrce ~r~ould ltave barred ltis recoverjv 
agaittst fltz defettclattt for injuries had he strr~~iverl, t/ten the decedent's heirs 
- - 
are barred from recovery in a wrongful death action." 
Id. at 1039-140,793 P.2d at 712-713 (emphasis added). In spite of the Bevan plaintiffs' 
arguments to limit the statute to its express language, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
condition precedent rule: 
We continue to follow long standing and well established precedent in the Idaho 
case law which construes the wrongful death statute and the comparative 
negligence statutes and hold that the plaintiffs can recover for wrongful death 
onlv when the wrongful act would have entitled the person injured to maintain 
an action i f  death had not ensued. 
Id at 1042,793 P.2d at 715 (emphasis added). 
Since Bevan was issued in 1990, the Idaho Supreme Court has continued to follow and 
reaffirm the condition precedent rule. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,247,985 P.2d 669, 
672 (1999) ("an heir may recover for wrongful death only if the decedent would have been able 
to recover"); Woodburn v. Manco Products, 137 Idaho 502,506,50 P.3d 997, 1001 (2002) 
("[tlhe derivative nature of a wrongful death claim" barred recovery by the wrongful death 
heirs). This Court should reject Plaintiffs' similar request to overturn this century-old line of 
cases. 
2. Sound Policy Reasons Supvort the Condition Precedent Rule. 
There are sound policy reasons supporting this Court's implementation of the condition 
precedent rule. Plaintiffs have ignored these policy considerations. 
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First, the application of the condition precedent rule fulfills the p q o s e s  of statutes of 
limitation. Without the rule, the limitations, period becomes open-ended. There is no 
justification for creating an open-ended limitations period, especially where these Decedents had 
their full two-year opportunity to pursue any claim. One court wrote: 
These courts . . . point out that if the new right is not dependent upon the 
possession by the deceased of a right at the time of his death there would be 
virtuallv no statute o f  limitations applicable to the new right, and that, hence, fhe 
new action could be brought twentv years or more after the tort had been 
committed. 
Piukkula v. Pillsbury Flouring Co., 42 P.2d 921,926 (Or. 1935) (emphasis added). This type of 
extended delay occurred in Howard v. Bell Telephone Co., 160 A. 613 (Pa. 1932). In that case, 
the decedent suffered the injury in 1905, but did not die from those injuries until twenty-one 
years later, in 1926. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court barred the wrongful death claim, 
explaining that "[tlo hold otherwise would be to say that a right of action which was legally 
dead could be revived by the death of the injuredperson." Id. at 615 (emphasis added). 
Without the rule, defendants would be forced to defend stale claims regarding facts "long 
forgotten:" 
The possibility that the injured person may diefive, ten or even twenty years 
after the injuries were sustained without having filed suit or otherwise settling 
the case would force the party responsible for the wrongful act or omission fo 
defend acts long forgotten and for which evidence and witnesses mav no longer 
be available 
Mason v. Gerin Corp., 647 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Kan. 1982). Without the rule, claims could be 
brought decades after the negligent act: 
Adopting the minority view by holding that a wrongful death action is not 
derivative of the underlying negligence action would undermine thepurposes of 
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statutes of limitation. If a viable underlying claim is not necessary, wrongful 
death actions could be brought several years, or even decades, after the 
negligent act which caused the death, andpossib@ without regard to whether 
the deceased had already sued and recovered damages during his lqetlme. 
Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879,882-883 (Wyo. 1998) (emphasis added). For these reasons, 
the purposes of the statute of limitations are served by the condition precedent rule: 
The majority of states refuse to allow a decedent's heirs to proceed with a 
wrongful death suit after the decedent has settled his or her personal injury case or 
won or lost a judgment before dying. Id. Given the underQing rationale, and 
given that the core purpose of  anv statute of  limitations is to comuel exercise of 
a right within a reasonable time to avoid stale claims, loss of  evidence, and 
faded memories, Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 
1989), we see no reason to impose a different rule regarding the heirs' 
maintenance of a wrongful death snit where an iniured uatient has chosen to let 
the statute of  limitations run on the underlving personal injury claim rather 
than settling or litigating the claim. 
Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327,332 (Utah 1997) (emphasis added); see Adams v. 
Armstrong World Ind., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (D. Idaho 1984) (without the rule, a 
wrongful death claim could revive a claim after the acts were "long forgotten and for which 
evidence and witnesses may no longer be available"). 
Second, the condition precedent rule is necessary to enforce the decedent's choice 
regarding the claim. In this case, the Decedents chose not to pursue any claims in Idaho against 
these Defendants.'" The condition precedent rule gives deference to the decedent's decisions 
regarding the handling of the claim, allowing the decedent to be "master of his own claim": 
I4 John H. Adamson filed two other suits, one in Mississippi and one in Georgia. (App. 
Br. xiv). The Georgia case is currently on appeal. John H. Adamson could have filed a suit in 
Idaho, but he chose not to. The statute of limitations expired on the Idaho claim during his 
lifetime. That expired claim did not revive by his death. 
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As osle of the foremost authorities on the law of torts has observed, the rationale 
underlying the rule barring the heirs from bringing a wrongful death suit after the 
injured patient has brought suit on the underlying personal injury action is that 
"the injured individual is not merely a conduit for the support of others, he & 
master o f  his own claim and he mav settle the case or win or lose a judgment on 
his own iniuw even thouzh others rnav be dependent uvon him." W. Page 
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts Ej 127, at 955 (5th ed. 
1984). 
Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc. at 332 (emphasis added). A court should treat the decedent's 
choice not to pursue a claim like a decedent's choice in relation to a settlement or judgment: 
The situation where a person fails to bring an action for his personal injuries 
within the statute of limitations period and dies is analogous to situations where 
the injuredperson s- his claim forpersonal injuries and releases the 
defendant prior to the death of the injured person, or where hepursues his 
personal injury claim to trial and obtains a judzment against the wrongdoer. 
Mason v. Gerin Corp., 647 P.2d at 1345. A court should treat the passing of the statute of 
limitations like other affirmative defenses barring a claim: 
If a decedent's own cause of action were barred by governmental immunitv, or 
statute, or release, or res judicata, or anv other affirmative defense, there is no 
wrongful death action to accrue. 
Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex. 1992). This Court's condition 
precedent rule is based on important policy concerns, and should not he overturned. 
3. This Court Has Correctly Interoreted the Wrongful Death Statute. 
Plaintiffs' central argument is that because "Idaho's wrongful death statute contains no 
condition precedent language," this Court should ignore its many cases that have held that the 
statute does contain the condition precedent requirement. (App. Br. 8). This same argument has 
failed many times in the past, and it fails again here. 
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First, the argument is not new. This Court has heard and rejected it a number of times 
over the past 80 years. This Court first considered and rejected this same argument in the 1928 
case of Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho at 627,269 P. at 994 ("While this limitation or condition 
upon the maintenance of the action is not included in the Idaho act ..."). The same argument was 
repeated again and rejected again six years later in Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho at 678, 34 P.2d 
at 961 ("by the construction this court has placed on said statute it has the same force and effect, 
by implication, as if it expressly contained the provision"). The same statutory interpretation 
argument was raised and rejected again 30 years later, in Clark v. Foster, 87 Idaho 134,391 P.2d 
It is true that Z.C. 6' 5-311 does not contain the proviso common to most 
wrong-ful death statutes allowing the heirs to maintain an action for wrongful 
death only, 'Whenever the wrongful act would have entitled the person injured to 
maintain an action if death had not ensued.' However, for shty years this 
jurisdiction and others have uniformly held that the statute should be 
interpreted as i f  it contained the above qualzjlcation. 
Id. at 144,391 P.2d at 859 (emphasis added). The same argument was again raised and rejected 
26 years later in the case of Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 117 Idaho 1038,793 P.2d 71 1 
(Appellants argued "that the absence of [the condition precedent] language in the statute, I.C. 9 
5-3 11 ... demonstrates the legislature's intent not to require such a condition for recovery by a 
decedent's heirs"). In fact, this Court has rejected this same argument every time it has been 
raised. 
Second, Plaintiffs' argument ignores the statute's express language that requires that the 
heir provide proof of the "wrongful act or neglect" of the defendant. I. C. 5 5-3 11. In Bevan, 
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this Court explained that the condition precedent rule is implied by the "wrongful act or neglect" 
language in the statute: 
Furthermore, "wronp-ful act or neslect," as it is used in the statute, means a 
"wrongful act or neglect" as against the deceased. It necessarily follows based on 
the weil establishedlaw in this jurisdiction that i f a  defendant is not liable for 
injuries to the decedent had death not ensued, then there is no basis for 
recoverv bv the decedent's heirs. If a defendant's conduct does not make him 
liable to an injured party, then that defendant cannot be held liable in the event of 
death for damages resulting from the same conduct. 
Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 1 17 Idaho at 1041,793 P.2d at 714. Plaintiffs ignore that this 
Court interprets the express term "wrongful act or neglect" to require the condition precedent 
rule 
This interpretation originated in the 1904 case of Northern Pacific. In Northern Pacific, 
the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the term "wrongful act or neglect" implies the condition 
precedent rule: 
The two terms, therefore, - wrongful act and neglect, - imply alike the omission 
o f  some duty, and that duty must, as stated. be a duty owing to the decedent. It 
cannot be that, if the death was caused by a rightful act, or an unintentional act, 
with no omission of duty owing to the decedent, it can be considered wrongful or 
negligent at the suit of the heirs of the decedent. They claim under him, and 
they can recover only in case he could have recovered had he not been killed, 
but only injured. The company is not under two different measures of 
obligation, - one to the passenger and another to his heirs. If it discharges its full 
obligation to the passenger, his heirs have no right to compel it to pay damages. 
Northern PaczFc, 192 U.S. at 450. This Court did not insert the condition precedent rule into the 
wrongful death statute. Instead, this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court both reasoned that the 
term "wrongful act or neglect" in the statute requires the decedent to have a valid cause of action. 
Plaintiffs make no argument against this reasonable interpretation 
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Third, Plaintiffs' statutory argument fails because it extends too far. Plaintiffs argue that 
because the "statute contains no condition precedent language," it "does not impose a condition 
precedent on the right of the heirs." (App. Br. 8). If the "statute contains no condition precedent 
language" for the purpose of the decedent's statute of limitations, it also "contains no condition 
precedent language" for any other af-finnative defense, such as settlement or release, judgment, 
res judicata, collateral estoppel, waiver, immunity, or comparative negligence. 
Under Plaintiffs' interpretation, an heir could recover in full even though the decedent 
was found 99% comparatively responsible for his or her own death. Under Plaintiffs' approach, 
a living personal injury claimant would have difficulty settling his or her own claim, because the 
living claimant could not provide a final release to any defendant. Under Plaintiffs' 
interpretation, an heir could obtain damages from a defendant even if the defendant had 
previously obtained a judgment in its favor against the decedent's claim. Similarly, under 
Plaintiffs' argument, an heir could recover from a defendant even though decedent's claim had 
been previously waived or barred by immunity arising from the relationship between decedent 
and the defendant. 
These scenarios flow directly from Plaintiffs' all-or-nothing statutory interpretation. 
Plaintiffs' argument that the statute contains no condition precedent rule does not allow for 
application of the condition precedent in some situations and not others. Under Plaintiffs' 
interpretation, no affirmative defense against the decedent would preclude any claim of the 
wrongful death heir. Plaintiffs' argument fails because it is overbroad. 
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Fourth, the Plaintiffs' statutory construction argument misstates Idaho law regarding the 
interpretation of statutes.'' It is m e  that statutory interpretation begins with the literal words of 
the statute, and that the language must be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning. Senator, 
Inc. v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 566, 570,67 P.3d 45,49 (2003). However, Plaintiffs ignore the 
remainder of the rule. which states: 
Our goal is to give effect to the purpose of the statute and the legislative intent in 
enacting it, which may be implied from the language used or inferred on 
grounds o f  aolicv or reasonableness. 
Id. at 570 (emphasis added); Thomson v. City ofLewiston, 137 Idaho 473,478,50 P.3d 488,493 
(2002) ("The legislature's intent in enacting a statute may be implied from the language used or 
inferred on the grounds of policy or reasonableness."); Crawford v. Dept. of Corrections, 133 
Idaho 633,635,991 P.2d 358,360 (1999);'~lackv. Reynolds, 109 Idaho 277,280,707 P.2d 388, 
391 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Stewart v. Rice, 120 Idaho 504,817 P.2d 170 (1991); 
see Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388,398-99, 11 1 P.3d 73,83-84 (2005) 
("we examine not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed 
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history"); Sumpter v 
Holland Realty, Inc ,  140 Idaho 349,351,93 P.3d 680,682 (2004). 
Plaintiffs also argue that "changes in the common law by the adoption of a statute are 
not to be presumed, but must be clearly intended before they will be given effect." (App. Br. 
18). This argument is directly contradicted by I. C. § 73-102, which provides that this rule "has 
no application to these compiled laws." Moreover, Plaintiffs' argument makes no sense. The 
wrongful death statute clearly changed the common law, which the Plaintiffs argue did not 
previously include a wrongful death right of action, Strict construction of the statute would leave 
that common law rejection of claims in place, rather than add an additional right to pursue 
expired claims. 
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There is nothing in this Court's earlier interpretations of I.C. 5 5-3 11 that violates the 
.rules of statutory interpretation. As explained above, it is reasonable to conclude that the express 
words "wrongful act or neglect" in the statute require the condition precedent rule. However, , if 
these literal words are not sufficient, the goal of this Court is to give effect to the purpose of the 
statute and the legislature's intent in enacting it, which may be inferred on the grounds of policy 
or reasonableness. This Court has repeatedly concluded that the purpose of the statute is met by 
restricting the wrongful death cause of action to heirs whose decedents had viable causes of 
action at the time of death. 
I;ifh, Plaintiffs ignore this Court's ruling that "The Idaho legislature, in enacting I.C. 9 5- 
311, adopted the substance of Lord Campbell's Act." Bevan, 117 Idaho at 1040,793 P.2d at 
713. This Court has concluded that the Idaho legislature intended to adopt the entirety of Lord 
Campbell's Act, including the condition precedent language. Helgeson, 54 Idaho at 678,34 P.2d 
at 961. This Court has already determined that the Idaho legislature intended to include this 
condition precedent language as part of its enactment of I. C. § 5-3 11. Plaintiffs make no 
argument against this Court's determination on this point. 
Sixth, Plaintiffs' argument ignores that the Idaho legislature has been aware of the 
condition precedent interpretation for nearly the entire 20th century. The Idaho legislature has 
not seen fit in the 105 years since 1904 to take any action to change this interpretation: 
Furthermore, the Idaho legislature, dating from the time of Sprouse v. Magee, 46 
Idaho 622,269 P. 993 (1928), through the present, has been and continues to be 
aware of this Court's interpretation and application of LC. 9 5-311 and has not 
found it necessary to enact 1e'~islation to change or modify the wrongful death 
recovery law as interpreted by the decisions of this Court. 
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Bevan, 117 Idaho at 1040,793 P.2d at 713 (emphasis added). 
For all of these reasons, Plaintiffs' statutory interpretation argument fails. This Court has 
reasonably found that the legislature did not intend to allow heirs to pursue claims that the 
decedent could not have pursued. Plaintiffs have given no valid reason to question this Court's 
historical and well-reasoned interpretation of the statute. 
4. Plaintiffs' Reliance on Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers Is Wrong. 
In Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 105 Idaho 785,673 P.2d 385 ("Chapman"), 
this Court correctly decided the straightforward issue that a wrongful death cause of action 
accrues at the time of death.I6 In Chapman, the injury occurred one month before the death of 
the decedent, so the decedent had a valid cause of action at the time of death. Id., 105 Idaho at 
786,673 P.2d at 386. Because the decedent had a valid cause of action at the time of death, the 
condition precedent rule was not an issue in the case. 
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs base their appeal almost entirely on the assertion that Chapman 
decided the issue in this case. There is no merit to this argument. Plaintiffs confuse the 
condition precedent rule with the statute of limitations for a wrongful death action. These are 
two separate and distinct issues. A wrongful death claimant must bring the wrongful death 
action within two years from the death of the decedent, but the claimant must also satisfy the 
l6 Plaintiffs' attempt to imply that the condition precedent rule was overruled by 
Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 105 Idaho 785,673 P.2d 385. That is obviously untrue. 
Chapman itself confirmed "the rule that heirs can bring an action only if the deceased could 
have." Id., 105 Idaho at 787,673 P.2d at 387. Moreover, this Court has confirmed and applied 
the condition precedent rule in at least three separate cases since Chapman was decided in 1983. 
Woodburn v. Manco Products, 137 Idaho 502, 506, 50 P.3d 997; Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 
at 247,985 P.2d 669; Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 117 Idaho 1038,793 P.2d 71 1. 
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condition precedent that decedent had a valid claim at the time of death. To maintain a wrongful 
death action, the wrongful death heir must satisfl both of these requirements. 
Plaintiffs' attempt to confuse Chapman is not new. The wrongful death plaintiffs in 
Adams v. Armstrong World Ind., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Idaho 1984), a case factually 
identical to this case, tried the same argument. Adams, 596 F. Supp. at 1412, a f d  in part, rev'd 
on other grounds 773 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1985), on remand, 664 F.Supp. 463 @. Idaho 1987), 
rev'don other grounds, 847 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Adarns"). A year after Chapman, the 
Federal District Court found: 
This Court finds that, if faced with the question, the Idaho court would apply the 
condition precedent rule to the statute o f  limitations situation, as it has done in 
situations involving conlributory or comparative negligence. 
Adams, 596 F. Supp. at 1412, 1414 (emphasis added).17 
Plaintiffs repeatedly attempt to mischaracterize the issue on appeal in this case as a 
question of when a wrongful death action accrues, which was the only issue addressed in 
l7 The wrongful death plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth 
Circuit attempted to certify the question to this Court. Waters v. Armstrong World Ind, Inc., 773 
F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1985). This Court declined to address the question, stating "its prior decisions 
'are sufficient to give guidance for the determination of the Idaho law involved in this action ..."' 
Adams v. Armstrong World Ind., Inc., 664 F.Supp. 463,464 (D. Idaho 1987); Adams v. 
Armstrong World Ind., Inc., 847 F.2d 589, 590 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). As a result, "[iln an 
unpublished opinion filed on May 5, 1986, the Ninth Circuit held that [the District of Idaho] had 
properly ruled on the questions." Adams v. Armstrong World Ind., Inc., 664 F. Supp. at 464. 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court, which held that the condition precedent rule 
bars expired claims. Plaintiffs interpret this history to mean that there is no condition precedent 
requirement. (App. Br. at 15-16). This is simply untrue. On the contrary, both the District 
Court and the Ninth Circuit dismissed the claims based on the condition precedent rule, after the 
Idaho Supreme Court referred them to its prior decisions on the subject. The Adams case history 
provides absolutely no support for Plaintiffs' appeal. 
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Chapman. (App. Brf at 1,3,4, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17). The Adams decision explains why the 
Chapman issue is not relevant: 
Plaintiffs argue that the Idaho Supreme Court in Chapman, supra, either 
completely or partially overruled the condition precedent defense in Idaho. . . . 
The question certified to the Idaho Supreme Court by this Court was "'whether, 
in a wrongful death action, the statute of limitations begins to run from the 
date of death or the date of the injury from which death resulted." 673 P.2d at 
386. The court held that the statute began to run from the date of death. That 
rule is not in dispute in the present case. 
Adams, 596 F.  Supp. at 1412 (emphasis added). The difference is that, in Chapman, the 
decedent's claim was not time-barred before death: 
In Chaprnai~, the deceased (lied witlzitz otre motrtlz oftlze (lute of  Iris itzitru)' ntzd 
tlrzts Itad a valid catte of actiott at the (late o f  his decttlr. at least valid in regard 
to the statute of limitations. In contrast, in the present case, the deceased died 
over five years after his last exposure to asbestos and thus, at the time of his 
death, his cause of action was time-barred. 
Adams, 596 F .  Supp. at 1414 (emphasis added). The same distinction applies here." The 
following table demonstrates the differences between the decedents in this case, the decedent in 
Adams, and the decedent in Chapman. 
Any broader construction would be relying on dicta. Adams, 596 F. Supp. at 1414 
("Though the issue was not before the Chapman court, it nevertheless made some remarks to the 
effect that the condition precedent rule would not apply to the situation presented there. Because 
these remarks are clearly dicta, however, they are not binding upon this or any other court") 
(emphasis added). Idaho courts are not hound by dicta. See Petersen v. State, 87 Idaho 361,393 
P.2d 585 (1964); Long v. State Insurance Fund, 60 Idaho 257,90 P.2d 973 (1939); Bashore v. 
Adolf; 41 Idaho 84,238 P. 534 (1925). 
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deals with expired claims, while Chapman did not. Since Chapman did not involve an expired 
claim, it does not contradict the rule that the condition precedent doctrine bars expired clai~ns. '~ 
5. Other Jurisdictions Apply the Condition Precedent Rule. 
This Court's condition precedent rule is not unique. Other states have wrongful death 
statutes similar to Idaho's statute, in that they do not expressly contain the condition precedent 
language of Lord Campbell's Act. Courts in those states have followed this Court's approach. 
For example, Utah's wrongful death statute does not contain any condition precedent language. 
In spite of this, in Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that the condition precedent rule barred the wrongful death plaintiffs from pursuing an expired 
claim. See also Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 162 F.2d 8 13 (1 0" Cir. 1947), a f d  333 US. 445 
(1948); and Miller v. Gastronomy, Inc., 110 P.3d 144 (Utah 2005). Similarly, Washington's 
wrongful death statute does not contain any condition precedent language. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Courl of Washington has held that the decedent must have had a valid cause of action 
at the time of death: 
In accord with the great weight of authority, this court has heldthat the action 
accrues at the time of death, and that the statute of limitations then begins to 
run. [] 
" Plaintiffs also attempt to use Chapman to attack the 1934 decision of the Court in 
Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667,34 P.2d 957. (App. Br. 16-17). Plaintiffs mistakenly assert 
that the defendants in Helgeson "asserted that the accrual date of the wrongful death cause of 
action was limited by the date of the injury causing dcath." (App. Br. 16). That is not correct. 
The action in Helgeson was brought well within any limitations periods. Helgeson has nothing 
to do with a statute of limitations issue, or with accrual dates. Instead, the heirs in Helgeson 
were benefited by the Court's rejection of the contention that explicit condition precedent 
language was necessary in order for heirs to recover on a surety bond. Id. at 678,34 P.2d at 961. 
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The rule, however, is subject to a well recognized limitation, namely, at the time 
of  death there must be a subsistinp cause o f  action in the deceased. 
Grant v. Fisher Flouring Mills Co., 44 P.2d 193, 195 (Wash. 1935) (emphasis added); see also 
Johnson v. Otorneier, 45 Wn. 2d 419,275 P.2d 723 (1954). 
Courts have also interpreted several federal statutes to include the condition precedent 
rule, even though those statutes do not contain an express condition precedent provision. In the 
case of Flynn v. N Y., NH.  & H R .  Co., 283 U.S. 53 (1931), Justice Oliver Wendell I-Iolmes 
explained: 
Obviously Flynn's right of action was barred, but it is argued that the right on 
behalf of the widow and children is distinct; that their cause of action could not 
arise until Flynn's death, and that therefore the two years did not begin to run 
until [the date of death]. But the argument comes too late. It is established that 
the present right, although not strictly representative, is derivative and 
dependent upon the continuance of a right in the injured employee at the time 
of his death. . . The running of the two years from the time when his cause of 
action accrued extinguishes [the cause of  action for wrongful deathi. 
Flynn, 283 U.S. at 56 (emphasis added); see also Burns v. Martin Transport Lines, Inc., 207 
F.Supp. 276,278 n. 5 (D.C.N.Y. 1962) (as decedent's claims were already barred at the time of 
death, heirs had no valid wrongful death action); Meth v. A.H Bull & Co., 2000 WL 121 1149 
(Del. Super. Ct. 2000) (heirs' wrongful death claim was barred, even though Jones Act did not 
contain condition precedent language, where decedent's personal injury claim expired prior to 
death). 
Many other states have followed the condition precedent rule to bar expired claims. 
Based on its survey of cases, the Idaho Federal District court concluded that the condition 
precedent bar is the "dominant rule," the "majority rule," the "most sound" rule, and the rule 
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followed by the "most recent cases." Adams v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 596 F. Supp. at 
1414. The following are some of these cases: Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d at 882 ("The clear 
majority rule is that survivors are precluded from bringing a wrongful death action where the 
deceased does not have a viable malpractice claim at the time of his death."); Russell v. 
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d at 348 ("If a wrongful death action exists, it accrues, not when 
the decedent was injured, but at his death, and the limitations period on that action begins to run 
at death. But if a wrongful death action does not exist because the decedent could not maintain 
an action in his own right immediately prior to his death, for whatever reason, then no wrongful 
death action ever accrues"); Mason v. Gerin Corp., 647 P.2d at 1345 ("where the injured party 
could not have brought an action for his personal injuries because the statute of limitations had 
run against his claim prior to his death, a wrongful death action cannot be maintained"); Lumber/ 
v Village ofSummil, 433 N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (Illinois, 1982) ("We further conclude that since the 
decedent in the case at bar was not entitled to maintain an action and recover damages for his 
injury at the time of his death, because the two-year personal injury statute of limitations had run, 
his administrator cannot now maintain this action for wrongful death."); Curtis v. Quality Floors, 
Inc., 653 So.2d 963, 964 (Ala. 1995) ("if a decedent's cause of action is time-barred at his or her 
death, then the decedent's personal representative cannot bring a wrongful death action"); Miller 
v. US.,  932 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying Virginia law); Nelson v. US., 541 F.Supp. 816 
(M.D. N.C. 1982) (North Carolina); Hick v. Missouri Pac. R.. R. Co., 18 1 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. 
Ark. 1960) (Arkansas); Nelson v. American Nat '1 Red Cross, 26 F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(applying District of Columbia law); Drake v. St. Francis Hosp., 560 A.2d 1059 (Del. 1989); 
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Hance v. Haun, 391 S.W.2d 621 (Tenn. 1965); Myers v. City ofPlattsburgh, 13 A.D.2d 866 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1961); May v. Pulmosan Safety Equipment Corp., 948 So. 2d 483 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2007). Plaintiffs have ignored these persuasive rulings from other jurisdictions. 
B. The Condition Precedent Rule Complies With Article I, Section 18 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
The Plaintiffs also argue that this Court's condition precedent rule violates Article I, 
Section 18 of the Idaho Constitution because "the effect is to time-bar a cause of action before it 
even accrues." (App. Br. 19). This argument has no merit. The Decedents in this case had two 
years to file a claim to recover any damages done to them. As a result, the only claim being 
barred is the same claim that the Decedents chose not to pursue over the entire length of the two- 
year statute of limitations period. 
In 1987, the plaintiffs in Adams brought the same "open courts" argument to the Idaho 
U.S. District Court, and the District Court rejected it. Adams v. Armstrong World Industries, 
Inc., 664 F.Supp, at 468 ("I3ence, Idaho Code § 5-219(4) is constitutional despite the fact that it 
eliminates certain classes of plaintiffs"). 
This Court has routinely rejected similar Constitutional challenges, consistently holding 
that the legislature can abolish common law causes of action entirely, prohibit or limit rights or 
remedies or impose statutes of limitations or repose without violating Article I, Section 18. 
Osmunson v. State of Idaho, 135 Idaho 292,295,17 P.3d 236,239 (Idaho 2000); Hawley v. 
Green, 117 Idaho 498,788 P.2d 1321 (1990) (upholding medical malpractice statute of 
limitations on misdiagnosis claims not discovered until after limitation period had run); Olson v. 
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J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706,717-19,791 P.2d 1285, 1296, 1298 (1990) (upholding product 
liability statute containing rebuttable presumption that a product's useful life expires 10 years 
after product delivery); Cummings v. J.R. Simplot Company, 95 Idaho 465,468, 5 11 P.2d 282, 
285 (1983) (upholding workers' compensation statute oflimitations on long delay disabilities); 
Twin Falls Clinic and Hospital Building Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19,644 P.2d 341 (1982) 
(upholding statute prescribing time for accrual of causes of action for negligent design and 
construction); Haeg v. City ofPocatello, 98 Idaho 315, 317, 563 P.2d 39, 41 (1977) (upholding 
restriction under Idaho Tort Claims Act prohibiting certain actions against a city); Jones v. State 
Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859,555 P.2d 399 (1976) (upholding the Idaho Hospital-Medical 
Liability Act which limited remedies available in medical malpractice actions); Moon v. Bullock, 
65 Idaho 954, 15 1 P.2d 765 (1944), overruled on other grounds, Doggett v. Boiler Engineering 
& Supply Co., Inc., 93 Idaho 888,477 P.2d 51 1,513 (1970) (establishing the Court's 
interpretation of Article I, Section 18). 
This Court set out its approach to the application of Article I, Section 18 in Moon v 
Bullock, supra. In Moon, plaintiffs argued that a statute abating their wrongful death claims due 
to the death of the tortfeasor was unconstitutional because Article I, Section 18 guarantees a 
remedy for every injury. The Moon court rejected this argument, stating: 
[Section 18 of Article I] grants no new rights, modifies no existing law, and 
prescribes no duties. It merely admonishes the courts to administer 'right and 
justice without sale, delay or prejudice.', and was not intended to enlarge or to 
extend the rights or the remedies of the citizen. Its purpose and effect are to 
secure the citizen the rights and remedies that the law as it then existed, or as it 
might be changed from time to time by the legislature, afforded. 
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Moon, 15 1 P.2d at 769. 
In Cummings v. J.R. Simplot Co., supra, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a 
workers compensation statute of limitations (I.C. Ej 72-407) under Article I, Section 18, arguing, 
as the Plaintiffs do in this case,,that the statute barred plaintiffs claims before he ever had an 
injury. This Court rejected that argument, holding that the purposes of limitations periods 
justified the statute: 
Such factors as loss o f  records, death or dislocation o f  witnesses, lapse of 
memories, difficulties o f  medical proof; and increased risk of  malingering (cite 
omitted) could have induced the legislature to enact I.C. 8 72-407 in the form 
in which it is now being considered. This court, due to a failure to clearly show 
any invalidity, finds that I.C. Ej 72-407 is constitutional. 
Cummings v. J.R. Simplot Co., 95 Idaho at 468, 51 1 P.2d at 285 (emphasis added). The 
same reasons justify the condition precedent rule here. 
The party asserting the unconstitutionality of the statute bears the burden of showing its 
invalidity, which must be clearly shown. Id. The Plaintiffs have failed to meet that burden 
They have not cited any Idaho cases to support their argument that the condition precedent rule 
under LC. Ej 5-3 11 is unconstitutional. Neither have they attempted to distinguish any of the 
Idaho cases construing Article I, Section 18, nor have they made any argument as to why this 
Court's reasoning in those cases should not apply to these cases on appeal. For these reasons, 
the Court should reject the Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Decedents allowed the personal injury statute of limitation to expire. Plaintiffs 
cannot revive these expired claims through their wrongful death actions. The "condition 
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precedent" rule has been a requirement for over a century, and that rule requires that a wrongful 
death claimant must show that the decedent had a valid claim at the time of death. Since 
Plaintiffs did not make that showing, the District Courts correctly followed this Court's well 
established rule and dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims. This Court should therefore affirm the 
District Courts' decisions. 
DATED this &day of October, 2009. 
D.. 
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Siemens Energy & Automation Inc. 
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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND JOINDER. 
This Response Brief addresses only those issues raised by Bechtel, Inc. 
("Bechtel"), and co-defendant Sterling Fluid Systems (USA) LLC ("Sterling Fluid") in the 
Adumson case. Bechtel was not served process in the Castorenu or Norton lawsuits and is not a 
party in those cases. Bechtel, however, generally stands in the same position as the other 
Defendants-Respondents in this consolidated appeal and pursuant to Rule 35(g), I.A.R. joins in 
the Brief submitted by Respondents Sterling Fluid, Viacon?, CBS, Westinghouse, Ingersoll-Rand 
Company and Henry Vogt Machine Co. 
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT. 
Plaintiff-Appellant John D. Adarnson ("John D.") claims that Bechtel and 
numerous other defendants exposed his deceased father, John H. Adamson ("John H." or 
"Decedent"), to asbestos, causing John H.'s injury and death.' John D., "individually, and in his 
capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of John H. Adamson" filed this lawsuit on 
July 18,2006, in the Sixth Judicial District Court for Bannock County, Idaho (the "Idaho 
complaint").2 R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1751-1783. 
Although this is not the first lawsuit seelting damages for Decedent's alleged 
asbestos-related injury, it is the first time Bechtel has been sued. John H. filcd personal injury 
' Consistent with Rule 35(d), I.A.R. Bechtei will use the actual names of the parties. 
John H. did not leave a surviving spouse but is survived by four adult children; namely, Ms. 
Sherilee Richter, Ms. Amy Jeanne Shissler, Mr. Robert Adarnson, and Plaintiff-Appellant Jolm 
D. Adamson. R. Vol. IX, Ex. A, pp. 2122 -2133. 
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suits in both Mississippi and Georgia before his death in July 2004. Because John H. (Decedent) 
did not name Bechtel as a defenda~it in those suits, Bechtel had no opportunity to cross-examine 
him about his alleged asbestos-e~~~ostlre.~ 
The Idaho complaint does not expressly state a claim for wrongful death, even 
failing to involte Idaho's wrongful death statute, I.C. 5 5-3 11, or reference any Idaho statute as 
the source of John D.'s claim. Rather than alleging claims on behalf of Decedent's heirs, as 
required by Idaho law, the complaint asserts a variety of claims for pre-death injuries and 
damages allegedly sustained by John 13. or his estate - damages not available under Idaho law to 
a decedent's heirs. Because the Idaho complaint is not well-pled and seeks damages that can 
olily be sought by a living injured plaintiff, not heirs in a wrongful death action, which formed 
the basis for Bechlel's summary motion, it is necessary to set out in detail the seven causes of 
action or counts asserted in the complaint. 
The First Cause of Action (R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1764-1768,117 36-45) asserts claims 
for negligence. As damages for the alleged negligence, the complaint states: 
"[tlhe defendants' negligent, grossly negligent, willful, wanton and 
recltless conduct . . . was the direct and proximate cause of 
Plailitiff s decedent's illness and death, as a result, tlze P l a i u t ~ ~ s  
decederzt suffered damages in the form of medical expenses, pain 
andsuffering, extreme emotiorzal distress, and other damages as 
can be identified at a trial of this action." 
The Mississippi suit (filed April 3,2002) was later dismissed without prejudice, while tlie 
Georgia suit (filed August 5,2004) remains pending. After John 1-1,'s death, one of his surviving 
children, John D., was substituted as the plaintiff in tlie Georgia suit. R. Vol. IX, pp. 21 14-2155; 
R. Val. IX, pp. 21 70-2201. 
The terms "First Cause of Actioii" and "Counts" are used by Plaintiff in his original complaint. 
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(Id., p. 1768, j  44) (emphasis added). 
Counts Two (R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1768-1770,17 46-54) and Three (R. Vol. VIII, p. 
1770-1771,1/7 55-58) include allegations for strict products liability (77 47-52), civil conspiracy 
(17 53-54) and lnisrepresentation (TIT/ 55-58). The complaint, however, does not assert any 
independent right of recovery as to any darnages for Counts Two and Three, but simply 
incorporates the previously alleged paragraphs. 
Count Four (R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1771-1777, fm 59-69) makes allegations of 
intentional tori ( j  60), civil conspiracy (77 61-63 and 66-69) and misrepresentation (77 63-64 and 
67-68). Again, however, as to damages, the complaint merely states that, as a result of the 
defendants' conduct, "Plaintiff's decedent sustained dnmnges" or, alternatively, that such 
conduct "substantially contribut[ed] to the injuries of tlze Plaintiff decedent." (77 65-66 and 
68) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Count Five (R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1777- 1779,77 70-76) - which alleges 
tortious conduct on the part of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company - asserts that, as a result of 
that conduct, the "Plaintiff decedent sufired the injuries described [in the "Danages" section 
of the complaint]." (7 75) (emphasis added). 
Count Six (R. Vol. VIII, p. 1779, //I 77-80) fails to identify any additional type of 
damages but simply states, contrary to Idaho law, that joint and several liability is appropriate as 
the defendants purportedly "aided, abetted, encouraged, induced or directed" each other's 
conduct (7 78). 
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Finally, and in contrast to the rest of the complaint, Count Seven (R. Vol. VIII, 
pp. 1780-1781,11 8 1-83) asserts a claim against certain unidentified "Premises Defendants," 
claiming that the acts alleged therein proxinlately caused "Plaintiffs decedent's disease and 
death and PlaintifSs damages as set forth herein." (1 81) (emphasis added). 
The phrase "Plaintiffs damages as set forth herein" relates to the "Damages" 
section of the complaint. R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1781-1783. Those enumerated damages, however, 
seek relief almost exclusively for darnages suffered by the Decedent, John 1-1. In fact, nine of the 
ten types of damages listed in that section relate to (I) Jolrn H.'s "physical pain and mental 
anguish" (sub1 "(a)"); (2) John H.'s "hospital and medical and pharmaceutical and other 
expenses" (sub1 "(b)"); (3) John H.'s "physical impairment" (sub1 "(c)"); (4) John H.'s 
"permanent partial disability" (sub1 "(d)"); (5) John H.'s "increased liltelihood" of cancer (sub? 
"(e)"); (6) John H.'s "medical monitoring" costs (sub1 "(f)"); (7) John H.'s "progressive loss of 
earning capacity" (sub1 "(g)"); (8) John H.'s "domestic help and nursing care" costs (sub1 
"(11)"); and (9) John H.'s diminished ability to engage in "hobbies and activities" (sub1 "(i)"). 
The only portion of the Idaho coinplaint that asserts a claim for damages on 
behalf of anyone other than Decedent or his estate is sub1 "(k)" of the "Damages" section, which 
provides that: "(lc) Consortium Plaintiff seeks dainages for a loss of consortium as a result of 
the Defendants' actions as described herein." Even in this regard, the coinplaint makes no 
mention of John H.'s heirs. nor is the term "Consoltiurn Plaintiff' otherwise defined. 
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C. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND ~ ~ S P O S I T I O N  BELOW. 
Bechtel and Sterling Fluid, two of the numerous defendants named in the Idaho 
complaint, filed separate motions for summary judgment. R. Vol. IX, pp. 2107-21 12 (Bechtel); 
R. Vol. IX, pp. 2134-2141 (Sterling Fluid). Bechtel moved for summary judgment on the 
grounds that: (1) all aspects of John D.'s complaint seelting recovery for injuries allegedly 
sustained by John H. or his estate as of the date of John H.'s death should be dismissed, as such 
survival claims cannot be maintained by non-spousal heirs under Idaho law; and (2) even to the 
extent John D.'s vague "loss of consortium" claim could be coilstrued as an I.C. 5 5-31 I-based 
wrongful death claim, that claim should also be dismissed absent either the joinder of John H.'s 
other heirs as parties or a tender of proof that the absent heirs consented to John D.'s pursuit of a 
wrongful death claim on their collective behalf. R. Vol. IX, pp. 21 13-2121. 
Sterling Fluid, on the other hand, argued that even if the complaint properly stated 
a wrongful death claim, there was a failure as a matter of law of a necessary condition precedent 
of any such claim under I.C. 5 5-31 1.  R. Vol. IX, pp. 2142-2160. More specifically, Sterling 
Fluid argued that because John H.'s asbestos-related claim was barred due to the lapse of the 
applicable limitation period before his death, binding Idaho precedent dictates that John D.'s 
wrongful death claim was also time-barred. Id. Stated differently, a claim for wrongful death in 
Idaho cannot be bl.ougIit unless the decedent could have stated an actionable injury clailn at the 
time of his death had death not ensued. 
On April 9, 2008, the district court in Adanzson adopted the rationale offered by 
Sterling Fluid in support of its motion, granted surnlnary judgment in favor of all of the 
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defendants named in John D.'s coinplaint (R. Vol. XI, pp. 2479-2494), and entered a final 
judgment implementing that ruling. R. Vol. XI, pp. 2495-2499. Rather than filing a notice of 
appeal, John D. filed two "motions for reconsideration" asking the district court to vacate its 
summary judg~nenl order. R. Vol. XI, pp. 2506-2525; R. Vol. XI, pp. 2546-2554. The district 
court considered both motions on their merits (R. Voi. XI, pp. 2598-2612), but denied those 
motions via an Amended Judgment entered on October 2,2008. R. Vol. XI, pp. 2613-2621. As 
reflected iin his October 31,2008 notice of appeal, John D. seeks appellate review of the district 
court's April 9, 2008 summary judgment order. R. Vol. XI, pp. 2622-2631. 
11. RESTATED AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1 .  Did the district court correctly apply the condition precedent rule and hold that a 
decedent's heir cannot state a wrongful death claim under I.C. 5 5-3 11 where the decedent's own 
personal injury claim is time-barred as of the date of death? 
2. Did the district court's application of the condition precedent rule violate the 
Idaho Constitution's "open courts" provision? 
3. Given that Idaho law prohibits a lion-spousal heir from lnaking a claiin for pre- 
death injuries sustained by the decedent or the decedent's estate and that Plaintiff John D. 
Adamson is a non-spousal heir making pre-death injury claims for the Decedent and llis estate, 
should such pre-death injury claims be dismissed as a matter of law? 
4. Given that Idaho's wrongful death statute, I.C. 5 5-3 11, requires that all heirs be 
joined as parties or affirmatively consent to representation; that Plaintiff John D. Adamson is one 
of four lteirs of the Decedent, John H. Adainson; that none of the Decedent's other heirs are 
party to this lawsuit; and that no evidence has been offered as to the other heirs' consent to 
representation by the Plaintiff in this matter, should Plaintiffs complaint be dismissed as a 
matter of law? 
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111. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court may affirm the district court's ruling for any of three reasons. First, 
the lower court correctly held that the condition precedent rule of Idaho's wrongful death statute 
precludes any clailn by the heir or heirs of the Decedent John I-l. Adamson. It is undisputed that 
on the date of his death, John H.'s own claim for any asbestos-related injury was time-barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations. For over 100 years, beginning with a United States Supreme 
Court decision interpreting Idaho's wrongful death statute and continuing in a long line of 
decisions from this Court, I.C. 5 5-3 11 has been interpreted to include an implied condition 
precedent that a decedent's heirs can recover on their wrongful death claim only if the decedent 
could have recovered on his own injury claim at the time of his death. This Court has not 
previously decided the precise issue whether Idaho's well-established condition precedent rule 
precludes a decedent's heirs from pursuing a wrongful death claim based on the decedent's 
decision not to pursue his own personal injury claim, which was thus time-barred at the time of 
his death. 
This precise issue was before Idaho's federal court in a case involving asbestos- 
related claims in 1984. The court decided that Idaho's condition precedent rule precluded the 
heirs fro~n asserting wrongful death clai~ns where the underlying personal injury claims oE the 
decedent were time-barred. In the course of that litigation, the Ninth Circuit certified the 
question to this Court, which rejected certification with the statement that the issue was answered 
by the Court's prior decisions regarding the condition precedent rule. The heirs in the 
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co~lsolidated appeals before this Court have provided no basis to reverse the district court's 
decision, which was solidly grounded in this Court's existing precedent. 
Second, and independent of the condition precedent rule in this case, the district 
court properly dismissed John D.'s claims for pre-death injuries and damages allegedly incurred 
by the Decedent or his estate, because he left no surviving spouse and all such claims and those 
of his estate abated as a matter of law upon his death. Although the district court did not reach 
this issue. its decision can be affirmed on this alternative basis 
Finally, the district court's decision may also be affirmed on the independent and 
alternative basis of John D.'s failure to join the Decedent's other heirs in his complai~it or 
provide any evidence of their affirmative consent to his representation. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal, the Court employs the same standard that the district court applies to 
grant summary judgment. Shawver v. Hucklebevy Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354,360-61,93 
P.3d 685,691-92 (2004). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the illoving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Jordan 
v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 590,21 P.3d 908,912 (2001). "The decision to grant or deny a request 
for reconsideration ge~ierally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." Jordan, 135 Idaho 
at 592, 21 P.3d at 914. 
The Court may affirm the district court's ruling on any theory supported by the 
record. Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407,415, 196 P.3d 325,333 (2008) (where an order of a 
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lower court is correct, but based upon an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the 
correct theory) (quoting, Andre v Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,459,680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984); see 
also McColm-Traska v. Baker, 139 Ida110 948,987, 88 P.3d 767, 770 (2004). If summary 
judgment is "right for any reason" (i.e., if any basis exists under Idaho law for such relief given 
the record on appeal), it should be affirmed on the correct theory of law, even if the district court 
rested its holding on an erroneous or inapplicable theory. Mason v. Tucker & Assocs., 125 Idaho 
429,432, 871 P.2d 846, 849 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Richard B. Smith Real Estate v. Knudson, 
107 Idaho 597,599,691 P.2d 1212, 1214 (1984), 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE CONDITION PRECEDENT RULE RESTRICTS AN HEIR'S WRONGFUL DEATH 
CLAIM IF THE DECEDENT'S OWN INJURY CLAIM IS TIME-BARRED AT DEATH. 
A condition precedent of any claim under I.C. 5 5-3 11 is that a wrongful death 
recovery can only be had if the decedent could have recovered damages for his injuries had death 
not ensued. See, e .g ,  Turpen v. G~mnieri, 133 Idaho 244,247,985 P.2d 669,672 (1999); 
Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 34 P.2d 957,961 (1934). Stated simply, and as held over a 
century ago by the United States S~lpreme Court in interpreting and applyillg Idaho's wrongful 
death statute, a decedent's heirs "claim under him, and they can recover only in case he could 
have recovered damages had 11e not been killed, but only injured." Northern Pac. Ry. Co, v. 
Adams, 192 U.S. 440,450 (1 904). 
Unlike some wrongful death statutes, 110 such "if the decedent could have 
recovered" condition precedent is included in tile actual text of I.C. 5 5-31 1. Regardless, in 
Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622,627, 269 P. 993, 994 (1928) t11is Court recognized that such a 
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condition was essential to any recovery under England's Lord Campbell's Act (9 and 10 Vict. 
ch. 93 ,§  I), upon which I.C. 9 5-31 1 was modeled. Thus, this Court in Spvouse adopted the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Idaho's wrongful death statute and held that, as 
an implied condition precedent, no recovery for wrongful death can be had under I.C. 5 5-3 11 
unless "the act, neglect or default [was] such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain 
an action therefor if death bad not ensued." Id. See Bevan v. Vassar Farms, 11 7 Idaho 1038, 
1040,793 P.2d 71 1,713 (1990). Accordingly, in Idaho a recovery is only allowed under I.C. 5 
5-3 11 "when the wrongful act would have entitled the person injured to maintain an action if 
death had not ensued." Bevan, I17 Idaho at 1042,793 P.2d at 715. 
It is indisputable that John EI. could not have maintained any claim against 
Bechtel for his alleged asbestos-related injury at the time of his death due to the lapse of the 
applicable limitation period. See R. Vol. I X ,  p. 2147. Nonetheless, John D. urges this Court to 
abandon or abridge LC. $5-3 1 1's now well-settled "if the decedent could have recovered" 
condition precedent, relying priinarily on Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, 105 Idaho 785,673 
P.2d 385 (1 983). See Apps' Joint Brief, part I, A, 2. The Chapman decision, however, does not 
answer the issue here: whether a decedent's decision not to timely avail hiinself of the 
opportunity of pursuing an injury clai~n in Idaho constitutes a failure of a condition precedent in 
the event that his injury later results in death and his heirs wish to pursue an I.C. $ 5-31 1-based 
wrongful death claim. 
In Chapman, the decedent died within a month of his injury. There was thilus no 
question that he could have pursued a timely personal injury claim against the defendants as of 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT BECHTEL, INC. - 10 
the date of his death. Chapman, 105 Idaho at 786, 673 P.2d at 386. Consequently, the only 
question considered by this Court in Chapman was whether the running of the two-year 
limitation period governing the heirs' wrongful death claim commenced with the decedent's 
injury or with his death. Uiue~narltably, this Court held that a wrongful death claim accrues, and 
the limitation period applicable to tlzat claim, begins to run "011 the death of the injured party, 
and not before." Id., 105 Idaho at 786, 673 P.2d at 386 (citing, Hogan v. I-lrman, 101 Idaho 
893, 623 P.2d 900 (1980); Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944)). 
Chapman did reject an argument that since the decedent's personal injury claim 
would have been time-barred as of the date of the filing of the wrongful death claim, the heirs' 
claim was liltewise precluded by the condition precedent rule ofthe wrongful death statute. The 
Court said that allowillg an heir to pursue a claim under those circumstances - i.e., in which the 
decedent did have a potentially viable injury claim at the time of death - would not improperly 
"enlarge the scope of tort liability" in a manner inconsistent with Lord Cainpbell's Act. Id., 105 
Idaho at 787,673 P.2d at 387. 
Chapman did not address, much less resolve, the question of whether the lapse of 
the limitation period governing a decedent's injury claim nzeasuved as of tlzc date o f  his rleatlz - 
so that the decedent did not have a claim against the defendant at the tinle of his death -would 
constitute a failure of I.C. 9 5-3 11's condition precedent. The issue did not exist based on the 
facts of Chapman. That question, however, was raised by the facts in Adains v. Armstrong 
World hdus. ,  596 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Idaho 1984), a f d  in part, rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 
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248 (9th Cir. 1985), on remand, 664 F.Supp. 463 (D. Idaho 19871, rev'd on  other grounds, 847 
F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1988). 
In Aduins, a case factually similar to this one, the decedent's potential asbestos- 
related injury claim was time-barred bccause he had not filed suit before his death. A wrongful 
death claim was filed by his heirs within two years of his death. 111 considering whether the lapse 
of the decedent's limitation period for filing an injury claim barred his heirs' wrongful death 
claim, Adams acluiowledged that this specific question had not been addressed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. But the court found that Idaho's courts, iffaced with this issue, "would apply 
tlie conditioli precedent rule to the statute of limitations situation, as it has done in situations 
involving coiitributory or comparative negligence." Adams, 596 F. Supp. at 1414. In addition to 
being "the dominant rule," the "majority rule," and the "most sound" approach to the issue, the 
Adams court made the followiiig observation, which is particularly applicable to asbestos cases 
where years or even decades may pass between tlie time of injury and death: 
The possibility that the injured person may die five, ten or even 
twenty years after the injuries were sustained without having filed 
suit or otherwise settling the case would force the party responsible 
for the wroligful act or omission to defend acts long forgotten and 
for which evidence and witnesses may no longer be available. 
Id (quoting, Mason 11. Gerin Corp., 23 1 Kan. 71 8,647 P.2d 1340, 1346 (1 982) (cits. omitted)). 
See also, e.g., Russell I? Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 349 (Tex. 1992); Slreet v. 
Consumers Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 575-76,30 S.E.2d 271,274-77 (1946). 
The prejudice in this case is real and illustrates the point made in Adanzs. As 
noted above, although John D.'s counsel pursued asbestos-related injury claims oil Decedent's 
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behalf in both Mississippi and Georgia while John El, was still alive, Bechtel was not ilanled as a 
defendant in those cases. Only now, in this Idaho suit filed almost two years after John H.'s 
death, has Bechtel been named as a defendant. That deliberate litigation strategy deprived 
Bechtel of any opportunity to cross-examine John 13. with respect to his purported Bechtel- 
attributable asbestos exposure. 
An additional policy consideration, not addressed in Adanzs, is that an 
interpretation of I.C. 5 5-3 1 1  that perinits the prosecution of and, perhaps, encourages the 
importation ~ f ,  stale asbestos-related liability claims to Idaho would not simply prejudice 
individual defendants such as Bechtel in this case, but would significantly erode Idaho's public 
policy interests in avoiding the litigation of stale claims and in preserving the resources of its 
courts. C ' ,  Ifigginson v. Wadsworfh, 128 Idaho 439,442,915 P.2d 1 , 4  (1996), quoting, 
Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397,402,700 P.2d 19,25 (1985) ("The policy behind statutes of 
limitations is protection of defendants against stale claims, and protection of the courts agaiust 
needless expenditures of resources."). 
It should be noted that the court in Adams specifically considered whether 
Chapman "either completely or partially overruled the condition precedent defense in Idaho" 
under circu~nstances involving a fully-lapsed limitation period pre-dat.ing the decedent's death. 
The Adams court observed that this issue was outside the scope of the certified question 
considered in Chapman - "whether, in a wrongful death action, the statute of limitations begins 
to run from the date of death or the date of the injury from which the death resulted." Adams, 
596 F. Supp. at 1414. Thus, any "rei~~arlts" in Cl7aynaun purportedly touching on the issue raised 
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in Adams, which is the same issue now before this Court, were clearly dicta which, in the words 
of the Adams court, are "not binding upon this or any other court." Id. 'The decedent's claims in 
Adams were time-barred at the time of his death just as claims of the Decedent are time-barred 
here. 
John D.'s reliance on Chapman fails to recognize the controlling distinction 
between a decedent's time-barred personal injury claiin and the beginning of a limitations period 
for a wrongful death claim. This confusion is reflected in the inischaracterization of the 
challenged summary judgments as having held that "the accrual date of the decedents' [sic] 
wrongful death causes of action started on the date each decedent was diagnosed with the 
asbestos-related disease and not on the date of death." Apps' Joint Brief, p. 1. 111 fact, the 
district court's summary judgment rested on a finding of the failure of a condition precedent to 
the bringing of the wrongful death suit, not a finding that those suits were, themselves, untimely 
for limitation purposes. See R. Vol. XI ,  p. 2605. Certainly, the suggestion that this Court 
intended for Chapman to overrule or abolish the "condition precedent" rule (Apps' Joint Brief, 
pp. 9 and 16-18) does not square with this Court's post-Chapman decisions recognizing the 
continued vitality of that rule. See, e.g., Tiu~.yen, 133 Idaho at 247, 985 P.2d at 672; Bevan, 1 17 
Idaho at 1042,793 P.2d at 71 5. 
Any claim of an inconsistency between Sprouse and its progeny and Chapman is 
considerably, if not completely, undermined by this Court's response to the following certified 
question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the Adams case: 
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May the heirs maintain a wrongful death action under Idaho Code 
$ 5-3 11 if the decedent, at the date of his death, would have been 
barred by the statute of limitations from bringing his own cause of 
action for personal injuries? 
Wafers v. Armslrong World Indus., 773 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1985). This Court rejected 
certification, choosing to leave Adam' conclusion, that Idaho law answered the question in the 
negative, undisturbed. See Adams v. Arnzslrong World Indus., 664 F. Supp. 463,464 (D. Idaho 
1987). 
In sl~ort, John D.'s position on appeal does not find support in any authority 
specifically interpreting and applying I.C. $ 5-31 1. And the only court to consider the argument 
advanced here flatly rejected that position as inconsistent with both well-settled precedent in 
Idaho and elsewhere as well as the important policies underlying the condition precedent rule. 
See Adams, 596 F. Supp. at 1412-1415. 
Although a minority of courts have found that the condition precedent rule does 
not bar a claim such as that made here,' the clear majority rule (and the one long-embraced by 
* See James v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., 154 Ariz. 594,744 P.2d 695,704-05 (1 987); In re Ilawaii 
Fed. Asbestos Cases, 854 F. S~tpp. 702,712 (D. Haw. 1994) (applying Hawaii law); Fisk v. 
UniledStates, 657 F.2d 167, 170-71 (7th Cir, 1981) (applying Indiana law); N.O. Nelson Mfg. 
Cory. ii. Dickson, 114 Ind. App. 668,670-71, 53 N.E.2d 640,641 (1944); Farmers Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Rice, 674 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Icy. 1984); Grainlich v. Travelers Ins. Co., 640 S.W.2d 180, 
186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Miller v. Estate ofSperling, 166 N.J. 370, 382-86, 766 A.2d 738, 744- 
46 (2001); Silverman. v. Lathrop, 168 N.J. Super. 333, 341-42,403 A.2d 18,22-23 (App. Div. 
1979); Brosse v. Cummii?g, 20 Ohio App. 3d 260,485 N.E.2d 803, 807 (1984); DeHarl v. Ohio 
Fuel Gas Co., 84 Ohio App. 62,69, 85 N.E.2d 586, 590 (1948); Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
Preston, 254 F. 229,232-33 (3d Cir. 1918) (ibrecasting Pennsylvania law, but see below), cert. 
denied, 248 U.S. 585 (1919); Hoover's Admi k v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 46 W. Va. 268, 
269, 33 S.E. 224,225 (1899). 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT BECHTEL, INC. - 15 
the United States Supreme Court) is that such claims are barred as the district court held in this 
case. 6 
John D.'s statutory construction argument is also not persuasive. Among other 
reasons, the proper scope of I.C. § 5-31 1's condition precedent rule should be guided by the 
common law as it existed when that condition was first held to be an essential element to a 
wrongful death action under Idaho law. See generally Sprouse, 46 Idaho at 629,269 P. at 995 
In 1928 - when the "if the decedent could have recovered" condition precedent of Lord 
Campbell's Act was adopted by the Idaho Supreme Conrt in Sprouse as part of Idaho's wrongful 
see, e.g., Flynn v. New York, New Ifaven & Hartjord R.R. Co., 283 U.S. 53,56 (1931) 
(interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Act); Curtis v. Quality Floors, 653 So.2d 963, 964 
(Ala. 1995); Ellis v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 268 Ala. 576, 578-79, 109 So.2d 699, 
701-02 (1959); Matthews v. Travelers hadem. Ins. Co., 245 Ark. 247,249-50,432 S.W.2d 485, 
488 (1968); Hicks v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 181 F. Supp. 648,653 (W.D. Ark. 1960) (applying 
Arkansas law); Drake v. St. Francis Ifosp., 560 A.2d 1059, 1060-63 (Del. 1989); MilJord Mem. 
Hosp. v. Ellioll, 58 Del. 480,482-83,2 10 A.2d 858, 860-61 (1 965); Nelson v. American Nat 'I 
Red Cross, 26 F.3d 193, 198-99,307 U.S. App. D.C. 52,57-58 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Ifudson v. 
Keene Corp., 445 So.2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. App. 1984), approved, 472 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 1985); 
Lamberl v. Village ofSummit, 104 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1037-38,433 N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (1982); 
Mason, 231 I<an. at 724-25,647 P.2d at 1344-45; Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 542 F. Supp. 944, 
948 (D. Kan. 1982) (applying ICausas law), aff'd, 741 F.2d 3 18 (10th Cir. 1984); Weinberg v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 299 Md. 225,238-40,473 A.2d 22,29-30 (Md. App. 1984) 
(applying New York law); Mills v. Internalio~zal Harvesler Co., 554 F. Supp. 61 1, 613 (D. Md. 
1982) (applying Maryland law); Ogden v. Berry, 572 A.2d 1082, 1083 (Me. 1990); Goodman v. 
Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 569-70 (3d Cis. 1976) (forecasting New Jersey law, but see 
above), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Kelliher v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R. R. 
Co., 212 N.Y. 207,211-13, 105 N.E. 824 (N.Y. 1914); Myers v. Cily ofPlallsburgh, 13 A.D.2d 
866, 214 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1961); Piuklcztla v. Pillsbury Astoria Flouring Mills Co., 150 Or. 304, 
31 1-18, 326,42 P.2d 921,924-26,929 (1935); Howard I). Bell Tel. Co., 306 Pa. 518,521-24, 
160 A. 613,614-15 (1932); Quattlebazlm v. Carey Canada, 685 F. Supp. 939,940-42 (D.S.C. 
1988) (applying South Carolina law); Russell, 841 S.W.2d at 348-49; Streel, 185 Va. at 570-76, 
30 S.E.2d at 274-77; Miller v. United States, 932 F.2d 301, 303 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying 
Virginia law); Miller v. Luther, 170 Wis. 2d 429, 439-41, 489 N.W.2d 651, 654-55 (Wis. App. 
1992); Edwards v. Fogarly, 962 P.2d 879,882-83 (Wyo. 1998). 
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death statute - that term of Lord Campbell's Act had already been held to bar wrongful death 
claims, if the decedent's right to pursue an injury claiin had lapsed during his lifctime due to the 
expiration of an applicable limitatioll period. Williams v Mersey Docks & IIurbour Bd , [I9051 
1 1C.B. 804. See generally Quultlebaunz, 685 1:. Supp. 939 at 941. The majority rule in 
American courts was the same, as reflected in the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Flynn, 283 U.S. at 56: a wrongfhl death claim was barred as a matter of law if the decedent's 
own potential injury claiin was barred at the time of his death. 
In conclusion, when the condition precedent rule was recognized as an implied 
term of 1.C; 9 5-31 I ,  the majority American rule was that a right to a wrongful death recovery 
was "dependent upon the existence of a right in the decedent immediately before his death to 
have maintained an action for his wronghl injury." Michigan Cent. R R. Co, v. Vreela~d, 227 
U.S. 59,70 (1913). There is no reason for this Courl to depart from established Idaho law, and 
because no such right existed in John H. at the time of his death, the district court properly 
granted suminary judgment. 
B. APPLFCATION F THE CONDITION PRECEDENT RULE DOES NOT IMI'LICATE THE 
IDAHO CONSTITUTION'S "OPEN COURTS" PROVISION. 
John D. argues that the application of the condition precedent rule to this case 
would violate the Idaho Constitutioll's "open courts" provision (art. 1, 5 18) because it would bar 
his right of recovery before the wrongful death claim accrued. Apps' Joint Brief, pp. 18-20 
In its entirety, art. 1, 3 18 simply provides, under the heading  lustic ice to be 
freely and speedily administered," that "[c]oui-ts ofjustice shall be open to every person, and a 
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speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, properly or character, and right and justice 
shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice." As surnrnarized in Venters v. 
Sorrenlo Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 252, 108 P. 3d 392, 399 (2005), this provision "merely 
admonishes Idaho courts to dispense justice and secure citizens the rights and remedies afforded 
by the legislature or by the commorl law, and [does] not create any substantive rights." See also 
DeMoss v. Cily oJ'Coeur Dillene, 118 Idaho 176, 181-82,795 P.2d 875,880-81 (1990). 
It is well established that a statutory provision (such as the condition precedent 
rule at issue i11 this case) can restrict a statutory or colnmon law-based right of recovery without 
violating the "open courts" provision. See, e.g., Osmunson v, State, 135 Idaho 292, 295, 17 P.3d 
236,239 (2000) (provisions of the Constitutionally Based Education Claims Act (CBECA) are 
constitutional even if school patrons are not entitled to pursue an immediate action); Jones v. 
State Bd, ofMed., 97 Idaho 859, 864-65, 555 P.2d 399,404-05 (1976) (limitation on damages 
recoverable in medical malpractice actions does not contravene the open court's provision of the 
Idaho Constitution), 
In particular, and contrary to John D.'s objection in this case, a provision can, 
constitutionally, have the effect of entirely abolishing a plaintiffs right of recovery before that 
right accrues. See, e .g,  Olsen I!. J A .  Freenzan Co., 117 Idaho 706,717-19,791 P.2d 1285, 
1296-98 (1990) (rejecting an art. I, 5 18-based challenge to the constitutionality of Idaho's 
products liability statute of repose [I.C. 5 6-14031, which had the effect of barring the plaintiffs 
claim before his injury occurred); Na~lley 11. Green, 117 Idaho 498, 500-01, 788 P.2d 1321, 
1323-24 (1990) (affirming the application of Idaho's medical malpractice statute of limitation 
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[I.C. 5 5-219(4)] to bar a plaintiffs claim before her injury could have been discovered and acted 
upon over an art. 1, 5 18-based constitutionality challenge). 
In short, constitutional concerns relative to art. 1, § 18 are not implicated even if a 
statutory provision has the effect of totally abolishing a right of recovery on a claim which was 
recognized by the com~non law at the time of the "open courts" provision's enactment. Johnson 
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 106 Idaho 866, 869, 684 P.2d 268,271 n. 4 (1984); Jones, 97 Idaho at 
864-65, 555 P.2d at 404-05. However, and as emphasized in John D.'s brief (Apps' Joint Brief, 
pp. 4-6), there was no co~nmon law right of recovery for wrongful death in Idaho - such a 
recovery is allowed only to tlze extent autlzorized by Z.C. $5-311. See, Whitley v. Spokane & 
Inland Ry. 'Co., 23 Idaho 642,132 P. 121, 126 (1913), a f d ,  237 U.S. 487 (191 5). 
As such, and as this Court has consistently held, the right of recovery under I.C. 
5 5-3 11 does not extend (and has never extended) to circumstances in which the decedent could 
not have stated an actionable claim for his injuries at the time of his death had death not ensued, 
the "open courts" provision of the Idaho Constitution is not even arguably implicated by the 
summary judgment in this case. CJ, Glick 1). Ballentine Produce, 396 S.W.2d 609, 615 (Mo. 
1965) (holding that the "open courts" provision of Missouri's constitutioll could not be 
implicated by any legislative restriction on wrongful death recoveries as "[tlhe legislature 
created the right of action where none existed bdore, and it may condition the right as it sees 
fit") (emphasis in original). 
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C. 0 ~ 1 , ~  A SURVIVING SPOUSE MAY ASSERT PRE-DEATH INJURY CLAIMS FOR A 
DECEDENT OR THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE. PLAINTIFF IS NOT A SURVIVING 
SPOUSE. 
Under Idaho law, a cause of actioii for personal injuries ceases to exist upon the 
death of the injured person. Steele v. Kootenai Med. Ctr., 142 Idaho 919,920, 136 P.3d 905,906 
(2006); Vulkv. IJaley, 112 Idaho 855, 858,736 P.2d 1309, 1312 (1987). Idaho law, however, 
does permit a surviving spouse to recover for losses to the marital community resulting from the 
deceased spouse's injury. Steele, 142 ldaho at 920-21, 136 P.3d at 906-07. Here, John H, was 
not survived by a spouse so all of his injury claims and those of his estate abated as a matter of 
law upon his death. 
Accordingly, and regardless of the application of the condition precedent rule in 
this case, the district court properly dismissed John D.'s claims for pre-death injuries and 
damages purportedly incurred by John H. or his estate. See generally Evans v. Twin Falls Cty., 
118 Idaho 210,217,796 P.2d 87,94 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1086 (1991) (general 
common law rule that personal causes of actioii do not survive the death of the injured party); 
Steele, I42 Idaho at 920-21, 136 P.3d at 906-07. In particular, any claim for John H.'s "pain and 
suffering" or other physical injury or impairment abated upon his death and cannot be prosecuted 
by the personal representative of his estate or by his heirs. Evans, 118 ldaho at 215-16, 796 P.2d 
at 92-93; Vulk, 112 Idaho at 858-59,736 P.2d at 13 12-13. 
Moreover, Pfau v. Cornair IJoldings, 135 Idaho 152, 15 P.3d 1160 (2000), 
directly addressed the question of ~vhether diini~i~~tion of estate damages ("loss of inheritance, 
loss of net accumulation andlor loss of earnings") occasioned by the wrongful injury of a 
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decedent could be recovered by that decedent's non-spousal heirs. That question was resolved 
contrary to John D.'s position in this case. 
In Pfau, the heirs of a married couple who died in a plane crash sought damages 
under I.C. 5 5-31 1 for "loss of anticipated inheritance." Id,  135 Idaho at 154, 15 P.3d at 1162. 
In considering an issue of first impression, this Court first noted that prior authority restricted 
wrongful death damages under I.C. 5 5-3 11 to compensation for the decedent's heirs' loss of 
companionship, protection, support and care. Even in this regard, it further limited recovery to 
the heirs' actual pecuniary losses, if any. Id., at 155. Based on an analysis of the legislative 
intent underlying the enactment of the wrongful death statute, the policy concerns implicated by 
such statutes and the inherently speculative nature of "lost inheritance" claims, Pfuu 
unequivocally disallowed such damages under I.C. 5 5-31 I .  Id 
While aclcnowledging that only damages for the heirs' own loss of consortium are 
recoverable under the wrongful death statute, John D. asserts in this appeal that "[ulnder Idaho's 
survival statute, the decedent's estate becomes the beneficiary and can sue for damages that the 
decedent could have sued for had he survived." Apps' Joint Brief at p. 14, citing I.C. 3 5-327; 
Hayward v. Valley Vista Cure Corp,, 136 Idaho 342,35 1,33 P.3d 816, 825 n.2 (2001) (Eismann. 
J., concurring). 
John D.'s position is not supported by the case law. The authorities to which he 
cites address the survivability of an injury clailn up011 the death of the tortfeasor, not the 
survivability of the claims up011 the death of the injured party. As noted above, the only claims 
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which survive the death of the alleged injured party are claims by a surviving spouse for 
economic damages to the marital estate. Steele, 142 Idaho at 920-21, 136 P.3d at 906-07. 
In direct contradictioil to John D.'s position in this case, "Idaho's wrongful death 
statute does not provide for economic damages ibr the loss of anticipated inheritance . . . and/or 
the loss of the net accumulatio~l of the decedent, andlor loss of earnings of the decedent." Pfau, 
135 Idaho at 158, 154 P.3d at 1166; see also, D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook, 5 25:9 (2d 
ed., rev. Sept. 2007); Cf,', Steele, 142 Idaho at 920-21, 136 P.3d at 906-07 (holding that, as the 
plaintiff died during the pendency of his lawsuit and did not leave a surviving spouse, his heirs 
would be allowed to amend their decedent's coinplaint to seek wroilgful death damages, but 
noting that the plaintifrs own causes of action - including any claim for his substantial pre-death 
medical expenses -"abated upon his death"); Hartman v. Gas Dome Oil Co., 50 Idaho 288,293, 
295 P.2d 998,999-1000 (1931) (holding that medical and funeral expenses could not be 
recovered by the decedent's heirs in conju~lction with a wrongful death claim absent proof that 
the heirs, rather than the decedent's estate, had paid tliose expenses or were contractually 
obligated to do so). 
Thus, based on the foregoing, the district cou~.t's su~n~nary judgment may be 
affirmed as to ally and all claims for damages for physical or econolnic injury allegedly incurred 
by John H. or his estate. See supra Part 11, A. The sulnlnary judgmeilt may be affirmed 
regardless of the correctness of the rationale offered by the district court in support of that 
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judgment. Mason, 125 Idaho at 432, 871 P.2d at 849; Richard B. Smilh Real Estate, 107 Idaho at 
D. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO JOIN THE DECEDENT'S OTHER HEIRS OR PROVIDE 
EVIDENCE OF THE111 AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT O REPRESENTATION. 
A persolla1 representative may pursue a wrongful death claim in Idaho under I.C. 
5 5-31 1 without formally joining each of the decedent's heirs only upon the affirmative consent 
of the fellow heirs. See generally Whitley, 23 Idaho at 657-58, 132 P. at 126 
As observed by the United States Supreine Court in its affirmance of Whitiey: 
We think that the decision [of the Supreme Court of Idaho], taken 
in its full scope and with its necessary implications, iilvoives the 
construction of the statute to the effect that the "heirs" are entitled 
to sue on their own behalf, and that tlze statute does not give to an 
administmtor or personal representative an independent riglzt of 
action, or autlzority to bind the lzeirs without tlzeir sanction, but 
an ndmini~~trator is autlzorized to sue only on tlzeir beknvand 
witlz tlzeir consent. 
Whitley v. Spokane & Inland Ry. Co., 237 U.S. 487,498 (1915) (emphasis added). It is therefore 
proper for a defendant to demand that the plaintiff, as a prerequisite to any recovery on that 
claim, provide affirmative proof that each of the decedent's heirs has consented to (or ratified) 
Remarltably, John D, attempts to avoid the impact of the condition precedent rule by noting that 
wrongful death claims are distinct from injury clai~ns under Idaho law in various ways, including 
the fact that, in a wrongfiil death action, the decedent's heirs may recover "only for the damages 
suffered by the heirs of the decedent because of his or her death, such as loss of guidance, 
support, etc." (Apps' Joint Brief, p. 14). He fails to note that - in stark contrast to such a 
limited, and thus permissible, wrongful death-based recovery - he seeks the recovery of damages 
for John 1-1,'s pre-death injuries including his pre-death pain and suffering. In short, John D 
invokes the limited nature of the damages permitted to Idaho wrongful death plaintiffs in an 
attempt to avoid the impact of the collditio~l precedent rule, while sin~ultaneously seeking a 
recovery far beyond those narrow parameters. This position reflects an extrelne example of a 
litigant seeking to eat his cake and have it, too. 
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the plaintiffs representative capacity. Id, at 498-99. Conversely, where the estate 
representative fails to either join each of his decedent's other lieirs or provide proof of each of 
those heirs' consent to his representative prosecution of the wrongful death claim, the wrongful 
death claim should be dismissed. See Canzpbell v. Paczj?c Fruit Exp. Co., 148 F.  Supp. 209,211- 
12 (D. Idaho 1957). 
Even construing John D.'s vague "Consortium Plaintiff' claim as an I.C. 5 5-31 1- 
based wrongful death claim brought in his capacity as the representative of John 13,'s estate, it is 
undisputed that John D. failed to either: ( I )  join each of John H.'s other heirs as parties to this 
civil action; or (2) produce proof that each of the other heirs had consented to John D.'s pursuit 
of a wrongful death claim on his or her behalf. These points were timely raised by Bechtel 
during the proceedings below. In response, John D. asserted that he had, in fact, provided 
"proper evidence . . . that he is acting on belialf and with the approval of all living heirs." 
R. Vol. X, p. 233 1. However, no such proof of consent or ratification by John H.'s other heirs 
was actually ever tendered. Moreover, John D. does not even purpoit in this appeal to bring this 
matter on the collective behalf of John H.'s heirs, but coiitinues to assert that he is prosecutiiig 
this appeal in his individual capacity and on behalf of John 13,'s estate. 
Thus, given John D.'s failure to avail himself of the reasonable opportunity 
afforded him to remedy that deficiency prior to the district court's entry of a summary judgment, 
this Court inay affirin the dis~nissal of his purpoited wroilgful death claim withoilt further delay 
or remand. C f ,  I.R.C.P. 17(a) (an action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute a claim in the 
name of the real party in interest once "a reasonable tiine has been allowed after objection for 
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ratification of commeilcement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in 
interest"). 
As such, John D.'s "loss of consortium" claim, even if construed as a wrongful 
death claim, cannot be maintained. Rather, Bechtel is entitled to the protection of well-settled 
Idaho law holding that a wrongful death claim 
cannot be split up and one action be prosecuted by one heir and 
another action by another heir or one action by the personal 
representative of the deceased and another action prosecuted by the 
heirs, provided the question or objection is raised in a proper 
manner. 
Whitley, 23 ldaho at 654, 132 P. at 124 (collecting cases). See also Hogan, 101 ldaho at 896-97, 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Bechtel, Inc. respectfully submits that the district court's April 9, 2008 summary 
judgment was proper as a matter of Idaho law based on the undisputed facts, both for the reasons 
stated by the district court and for the other reasons set forth herein. Accordingly, Bechtel, Inc. 
requests that summary judgment be affirmed in its entirety 
dn 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 2 day of October, 2009. 
HOLLAND & HART LLI' 
Attorneys f6r Bechtel, Inc. 
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